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Davis v Johnson1 resolved once and for all the correct interpretation of the Domestic 
Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (DVMPA) 1976, which had up until then been 
construed in different ways. The House of Lords held that the proprietorial right of a 
husband to occupy the matrimonial home in the event of his physical abuse of a wife 
(section 1(1)(c)) or partner (section 1(2)) could be suspended, thereby excluding the 
husband or male partner from the property or part of it (section 1(1)(c)). The five judges 
(Lords Diplock, Kilbrandon, Salmon and Scarman and Viscount Dilhorne) were unanimous 
that the DVMPA provided a wife or partner with a remedy for protection which allowed for 
interference with a husband or male partner’s proprietorial right in cases where her life was 
in serious or grave danger. For the first time, the law provided protection for wives and 
cohabitants living in the same household. Lord Salmon stated:  
In my view Parliament in passing this Act, was not concerned with the preservation of 
proprietary rights but with affording protection to ‘battered wives’. … I am certain 
that the Act of 1976 was not intended to deprive him of his proprietary rights … but 
only to interfere for a fairly short period … whilst his former mistress had the 
opportunity to look for accommodation.2  
I. CONTEXT  
In 1976, few women shared rights in the matrimonial home and few, if any, were the sole 
owner, sole tenant or occupier. However, prior to the enactment of the DVMPA that year 
the legal remedies available to a wife or unmarried partner seeking protection from 
domestic violence were extremely limited. A wife could apply under the Matrimonial Homes 
Act 1967 for injunctive relief against a husband’s violence but only where proceedings for 
divorce or judicial separation had been initiated. For many women, divorce or separation 
was not an option; financial dependency, need for housing, support to children, shame, and 
fear of further violence were just some of the factors compelling women to remain in violent 
relationships and often in silence. Unmarried partners, referred to by the Lords in Davis v 
Johnson as ‘mistresses’ or ‘cohabitees’, were in a different (worse) position. There was no 
protection except to report the incident to the police and seek any remedy that the under-
enforced criminal law might offer.  
Yet the risk of violence behind closed doors was very real. One-fifth of all recorded 
homicides, irrespective of the relationship of victim to suspect, were committed against 
female spouses and cohabitants. Robert Chester and Jane Streather’s study on cruelty and 
divorce in 1972 found that, of 8,800 English divorces granted in 1967, 94 per cent were 
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granted to wives and a third on ‘cruelty’ grounds. In 90 per cent of these cases repeated 
physical violence was reported.3 The police were reluctant, moreover, to proceed with 
charges for criminal assault against men as the ideology of the privacy of the home 
prevailed, allowing men’s woeful conduct within it to continue unfettered, even in the face 
of brute violence against women. Perpetrators when proceeded against, if at all, faced the 
puny charge of breach of the peace and were subsequently fined.4 Mrs X who gave oral 
evidence to the Select Committee on Violence in Marriage in 1976 confirmed this use of 
breach of the peace even in circumstances of the most serious violence.  
I have had ten stitches, three stitches, five stitches, seven stitches, where he has cut 
me. I have had a knife stuck through my stomach; I have had a poker put through my 
face; I have no teeth where he knocked them all out; I have been burnt with red hot 
pokers; I have had red hot coals slung all over me; I have been sprayed with petrol 
and stood there while he has flicked lighted matches at me … I have been to the 
police … and they held him in over the weekend and he came out on Monday. He was 
bound over to keep the peace … On the Tuesday he gave me the hiding of my life.5   
There was evidence too of derisory sentences imposed by judges upon conviction of 
the perpetrator. Jo Richardson MP, presenting the Bill that was to become the DVMPA for its 
second reading in the House of Commons, reported a case where a husband even with two 
previous convictions for assaulting his wife evaded appropriate punishment: 
During one attack, he tied a flex so tightly round her throat that her larynx was 
damaged and she had to be fed through a tube in hospital. The man was taken to court, 
fined £2 and told to behave himself.6 
Domestic violence was not, as is so often imagined, only ‘discovered’ by second-
wave feminists. First-wave feminists like Frances Power Cobbe had campaigned vigorously 
for the authorities to take it more seriously (for example, in her influential article ‘Wife 
Torture in England’)7 and to increase penalties against men who beat their wives. Their 
efforts led to the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1878, which enabled women to 
leave their violent husbands and get maintenance. In 1949, Renee Duffy, a battered wife, 
was convicted of the murder of her violent husband.8 Though her appeal against conviction 
was refused, overwhelming public sympathy resulted in a petition (organised by her 
solicitor, Frank R Johnson), supported by 12,000 signatures ensured her reprieve from a 
death sentence.9  
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But the Women’s Liberation Movement can take credit for starting to bring about 
real change in the treatment of domestic violence. In 1971 Erin Pizzey published Scream 
quietly or the Neighbours will hear, which detailed the testimonies of women who had fled 
domestic abuse.10 In 1974 she founded Chiswick Family Aid in 1974 and the National 
Women’s Aid Federation was set up in the same year to provide support to victims of 
domestic violence, the first national domestic violence organisation. The burgeoning sexual 
politics of the 1970s also provided the political articulation of the specificities of women’s 
oppression.11 One of the seven demands of the Women’s Liberation Movement called for an 
end to domestic violence.12 In 1975, following the Select Committee on Violence in 
Marriage,13 Jo Richardson introduced a Private Member’s Bill on Domestic Violence which 
was later supported by the Government. At 2.10pm on 13 February 1976, moving the Bill for 
the second time she addressed the House of Commons:  
At about this time on a Friday afternoon thousands of women are dreading the thought 
of Friday night. To them Friday night can often mean a night of strife with the man in 
the house. It can mean a night that ends in injury and battering, yet relatively few 
people, possibly not even the neighbours, may know about it. To many women it is 
something that they feel they should keep within the family, so they continue to suffer 
it. Some women are injured on week nights, and at any time, but Fridays and 
weekends, when father is at home, are times to be dreaded in many families.Wife 
beating is as old as the hills. Unfortunately there are many who believe it is their right 
to beat their women and that any interference from outside is an unwarranted 
intrusion.14 
The enactment of the DVMPA in 1976 was enormously important for all women, but 
especially those living in and through abusive relationships. It gave the county courts power 
to grant non-molestation injunctions against the abusive spouse or cohabitee and also 
allowed for the making of orders to exclude them for a period from the family home. 
II. THE LANDMARK 
So how did this eminently sensible piece of legislation just two years later come to be 
considered by the House of Lords?  
Nehemiah Johnson and Jennifer Davis were unmarried cohabitants living together as 
joint tenants in a council flat at 13, Nisbet House, Homerton High Street, East London. 
Jennifer Davis was the victim of violence inflicted by Nehemiah Johnson which the Court of 
Appeal described as ‘extreme’, forcing her to leave with their daughter of two and a half and 
seek refuge in a Women’s Refuge in Chiswick on the other side of London (one of the few 
refuges in the city). Johnson threatened to kill Davis, and said he would dump her in the river 
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or chop her up and put her in the freezer. The case, which was legally protracted, no doubt 
further compounding her mental anguish, commenced with a hearing in the Brentford 
County Court on 18 October 1977, almost a year to the day since the enactment of the 
DVMPA, and concluded on 9 March 1978. 
Davis was initially successful. District Judge Paulusz, in Brentford County Court, 
granted her the relief she sought, restraining Johnson from assaulting or molesting her or 
their child and ordering him to vacate the flat. (Six days later, the Court of Appeal, in the 
case of Cantliff v Jenkins,15 determined that the DVMPA did not permit exclusion of a 
perpetrator where parties were joint tenants since each had equal interest in the property 
(by virtue of the Law of Property Act 1925). In other words, the remedy was only available in 
the relatively rare circumstances that the victim of violence was the sole owner or sole 
tenant of the property. A companion case, B v B,16 also ruled that the DVMPA did not apply 
to unmarried cohabitants). On October 26 Mr Johnson appealed the original order to 
another county court, where District Judge Lewis now found himself bound by the decision 
in Cantliff and rescinded that part of the original order which had required Johnson to vacate 
the property. Ms Davis subsequently appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal where, 
because of the reservations over the interpretation of the law, a court of five members 
instead of three was (unusually) constituted. 
Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal set down in plain narrative the problem and 
what needed to be done ‘to protect the weak and as Parliament intended’17 In his opening 
statement, he told it exactly as it was:  
Battered wives is a telling phrase. It was invented so as to call the attention of the 
public to an evil. Few were aware of it. It arose when a woman suffered serious or 
repeated physical injury from the man with whom she lived. She might be a wife 
properly married to her husband; or she might only be a woman called, falsely, a 
‘common law wife’.18  
The Court found for Ms Davis by a bare majority. Delivering the majority judgment, Denning 
LJ restored the original order of District Judge Paulusz requiring Mr Johnson to vacate the 
flat. In the course of his judgment, he held that the interpretation of statute allowed for 
consideration of, in this case, the findings of the Select Committee on Violence in Marriage:  
Some may say – and indeed have said – that judges should not pay any attention to 
what is said in Parliament. They should grope about in the dark for the meaning of an 
Act without switching on the light. I do not accede to this view.19 
Mr Johnson then appealed to the House of Lords, contending that section 1 of the 
1976 Act did not confer on a county court jurisdiction to exclude a person from premises in 
which he had a proprietary interest, and that the Court of Appeal could not depart from its 
earlier decisions, or look to other documents which had not been relied upon by counsel, in 
finding the intention of Parliament. In the House of Lords, Lord Diplock recognised that the 
provisions in the Act had led ‘to a conflict of judicial opinion’.20 Lord Scarman said the 
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section was difficult and obscure.21 Nevertheless, their Lordships were in (different shades 
of) agreement regarding the interpretation of section 1. Lord Diplock asserted that  
under the existing substantive law a mistress is entitled to protection against the tort of 
assault, and if, as in the instant case, she is a joint tenant with her paramour of the 
premises in which she is living with him, she has a legal right to continue in peaceful 
occupation of them.22  
Lord Scarman added that the intention of Parliament was to strengthen remedies and 
protect life and limb. Lord Dilhorne said that, whilst the Act made ‘drastic inroads into 
common law property rights of spouses’,23 he accepted that it applied to cohabitants or 
partners. It was conceded by all that the Act intended to ‘over-ride a property right, if it be 
thought to be socially necessary’.24 The original order of District Judge Paulusz was 
reinstated once and for all. 
III. WHAT HAPPENED NEXT 
Despite the victory won in Davis v Johnson, in the post-Davis period judges were reluctant to 
oust a man from the matrimonial home even for a short period of time; the ‘grave and 
serious violence’ threshold trigger to the remedy was rarely met. Statistics showed 
depressingly that few such ouster injunctions were granted.25 On 1 October 1997, almost 20 
years to the day since Davis went to the Brentford County Court, the DVMPA was repealed. 
Section 33(7) of the Family Law Act 1996 introduced a new creature for interpretation by the 
courts: the ‘balance of harm’ test. This required that the significant harm suffered by the 
applicant had to be established as being as great as or greater than the harm to the other 
party from being excluded before an ouster injunction could be made. The human rights of 
both parties were set against each other. Moreover, in balancing her need for safety and 
protection against his right to residence, consideration had to be given to the housing needs, 
financial resources, and the likely effect of any order on the health, safety or well-being of 
the parties (section 33(6)). Thus in Chalmers v Johns,26 refusing an occupation order for 
exclusion, Thorpe LJ asserted, ‘[t]he order remains draconian, particularly in the perception 
of the respondent. It remains an order that overrides proprietary rights and it seems to me 
that it is an order that is only justified in exceptional circumstances’.27 More recently, the 
1996 Act has been amended by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, which 
among other things removed the distinction between married and cohabiting couples 
(section 2) and extended the provisions of the 1996 Act to same-sex (section 3) and non-
cohabiting couples (section 4). 
Unduly lenient sentences for domestic violence and domestic violence manslaughter 
persisted, prompting Labour MP Harriet Harman, when Solicitor General, in December 2002, 
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to refer lenient sentences in domestic violence manslaughter back to the Court of Appeal with 
a view to ‘encourage judges to impose stiffer terms of imprisonment’.28 They did not.29  
IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
Without doubt Davis v Johnson was a turning point both in law and in judicial 
understanding of domestic violence. The problem of domestic violence, despite these 
changes, remains a significant problem in its extent and in the failings of the criminal 
justice response. Over a quarter of women have experienced domestic abuse since the 
age of 16.30 On average two women in England and Wales are killed by their current or 
former partner every week.31 Cuts to Legal Aid are making it significantly harder for 
women to access the courts to protect themselves and their family.32 The position 
adopted by the House of Lords in Davis appears to be in retreat. The significant gains 
for battered women introduced and made possible by Lord Denning in the Court of 
Appeal and approved by the House of Lords have been realigned through the lens of 
‘rights’ which, together with the ‘balance of harm’ test to be applied in applications 
involving a condition of exclusion (section 33(6) and (7) of the Family Law Act 1996), 
introduces a notional level playing-field in a land of unequals. 
In February 2017 the Prime Minister, Theresa May, announced a ‘major programme 
of work leading towards bringing forward a Domestic Violence and Abuse Act’. This was later 
confirmed in the Queen’s Speech. The Act will establish a Domestic Violence and Abuse 
Commissioner, as well as consolidate existing protection orders. It remains to be seen 
whether this ambition survives the Brexit landscape, but if it does Davis teaches us that 
there will be a new generation of judges and practitioners who require continuous 
enlightenment and understanding of the prevalence and seriousness of domestic violence, 
both in the effects of violence on its victims and also the consequent homelessness which 
follows when women are forced to leave in order to protect their lives. 
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